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Abstract
In this paper we study the determinants of banks' decision to adopt a transactional web-
site for their customers. Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the
period 2003-2006, we show that although bank-specic characteristics are important deter-
minants of banks' adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role. The extent
of competition is related to the geographical overlap of banks in dierent markets and their
relative market share in terms of deposits. In particular, banks adopt earlier in markets where
their competitors have already adopted. In order to construct the dierent local markets,
this paper is one of the rst that makes use of the geographic market denitions delimited
by the Cassidi
R  Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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The arrival of the Internet not only spurred the development of new industries but it also changed
the business model of many others. This is, for example, the case of the banking sector. In 1995,
the Security First Network Bank was the rst internet-only bank created. Around the same time,
Wells Fargo was the rst brick-and-mortar bank to establish its online presence. For most of the
rest of the banks, however, online presence in the rst few years simply meant only the creation of
a static corporate website. Banks soon started to develop software applications that rst allowed
customers to access their accounts and later allowed them to perform nancial operations online.
By the end of 2003, more than half of the commercial banks present in the U.S. oered some
online-banking services to their customers.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of a bank's decision to adopt online
banking. In particular, we focus on the strategic considerations of this adoption, mainly in response
to the adoption decisions of competitors in the same markets. We show that banks that operate
in markets where competitors have already adopted online banking tend to adopt earlier. This
eect persists even after controlling for the standard measures of the degree of competition in
the market and other market characteristics. Bank specic measures, such as its size, as well as
standard measures of a bank's nancial health are also important determinants.
There is a considerable literature, particularly in the eld of industrial organization, regard-
ing the optimal adoption of new technologies by a rm. For example, Oster (1982) studies the
introduction of the basic oxygen furnace used in steel making. She approaches this decision as
technologically driven, independent of the decisions taken by competitors.1 Later papers have
introduced strategic considerations, mainly through the use of the Herndahl index as a summary
statistic of the intensity of competition. In the banking industry this strategic component is stud-
ied in Hannan and McDowell (1984) and Hannan and McDowell (1987) in the adoption of ATMs,
and in Akhavein et al. (2005) for the adoption of credit scoring.2
Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) summarizes the determinants of the decisions to adopt a
new technology in a competitive context.3 These determinants are structured around 4 dierent
mechanisms: rank, stock, order and epidemic eects. Rank eects, mainly related to rm size,
stem from the fact that adoption costs typically increase less than proportionally with the size
1Rose and Joskow (1990) study adoption decisions in markets where rms are local monopolies. In this case,
the assumption that strategic interactions are absent is rather natural.
2Also in the context of ATMs, Saloner and Shepard (1995) and Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) study the
network eects that technology adoption entails. Pennings and Harianto (1992) study the eect of the information
technology accumulation in banks and the linkage across institutions in the adoption of videobanking.
3See Geroski (2000) and Hoppe (2002) for a review of the theoretical literature.
2of the rm and decrease over time. As a result, rms adopt according to their size: larger rms
adopt earlier. Stock eects are related to the idea that the benets from adopting a new technology
depend strategically on the number of rms that have already adopted it. Order eects arise when
the return from adoption depends on the order in which rms have adopted, for example, due
to preemption motives: rms might adopt early to make adoption unprotable to competitors.
Finally, epidemic eects assume that the diusion of new technologies is faster when more rms
have adopted.
The decision to provide online-banking services is dierent from the replacement of an existing
technology studied in the classical examples in the adoption literature. Instead, online banking
coexists with the traditional channels that include not only bank branches but also telephone
banking. For example, opening an account requires a visit to the branch, and this is also (together
with ATMs) the main way to withdraw or deposit money. At the same time, online banking reduces
the cost of providing a wide variety of products to customers. Whether dierent channels substitute
or complement each other is an empirical question. Corrocher (2006) for example, nds for Italy
that online-banking and physical presence (measured as branching intensity) are substitutes. An
interpretation is that, for less established banks (with fewer branches) online-banking is a more
ecient way to access new clients. DeYoung et al. (2007) in a sample of U.S. banks in the late
1990s, however, nds that branching intensity and online banking are complementary and also
shows that online-banking adoption positively aects the bank's later performance.4
In spite of the importance of online banking, the literature on its adoption is still scarce. Very
few papers have studied the demand for these services. One example is Chang (2004) which
studies the consumer-adoption decision of this technology in South Korea. The author infers that
risk aversion and customer inertia make bank investments in this new technology unlikely to be
protable. As a result, she concludes that bank adoption might arise due to the positive reputation
eects it entails or preemptive motivations towards competitors.
Studies regarding the supply side for the U.S. include Furst et al. (2001), Nickerson and Sullivan
(2003) and Sullivan and Wang (2005). Furst et al. (2001) studies the determinants of adoption
using a cross-section of banks for 1999. The authors do not include strategic considerations. They
show that protability, bank size, presence in urban markets, and membership in a bank holding
company are all positive and good predictors of the decision to adopt.
Nickerson and Sullivan (2003) embeds the strategic decision regarding the adoption of online
banking in a real options environment. Their theoretical model shows that market leaders are more
4This divide has also arisen in the study of the adoption of ATMs in relation to the number of branches. Whereas
Ingham and Thompson (1993) nds that ATMs and physical branches are substitutes, Saloner and Shepard (1995)
obtains the opposite result.
3likely to adopt if competition consists of small rms or if uncertainty in the demand is small. They
conrm these hypotheses using also a cross-section for 1999. Sullivan and Wang (2005) studies
the pattern of diusion of technological innovations in dierent states. They propose a theoretical
model that is later tested using observations at the statewide level. They estimate slower adoption
patterns for those states where per capita income is lower, internet access is more scarce or banks
are older. More important, adoption is also slower in states where banks are smaller. To the
extent that rank eects make big banks more likely to adopt, the authors interpret this last result
as supportive of the existence of epidemic eects, since smaller banks could learn from them.
Our paper departs from the previous literature in that we measure the strategic decision of rms
to adopt online banking as a response to the adoption decisions of competitors. In the terminology
introduced earlier, we measure the total stock and order eects. In principle, the increasing
adoption of online banking is no indication of a positive eect on the adoption probability of the
late adopters, as most of the adoption is likely to be driven by the fast decrease in the cost of
providing this service. In principle, two opposing strategic forces might shape the adoption decision.
On the one hand, an increasing adoption by competitors reduces the prots from implementing
the technology and might delay adoption. On the other hand, the prots from not adopting might
be reduced in a larger or smaller extent depending on how important is this additional service
to customers. Which force dominates and whether this force operates in a dierent direction for
dierent kinds of banks is the empirical question we want to address. Overall, our results show that
the decline in prots from not adopting dominates, as the banks' adoption probability increases in
response to the adoption of competitors.
In order to quantify these eects we use a dataset on online adoption that has been available only
recently. Starting in 2003, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) asked institutions
to indicate in their quarterly Call Reports whether their websites allowed customers to execute
transactions or not.5 We complement this dataset with information at the bank level using the
Summary of Deposits also from the FDIC, and demand characteristics obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau. As opposed to other papers in the literature, we benet from the construction of
a panel that allows us to estimate a hazard model of the time until the adoption decision.
To the extent that we are interested in determining the strategic component of adoption, it is
essential to identify the relevant market in which banks operate, and the competitors they face.
Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to delimit this competition. Many banks compete at a
national level, others at the state level, and nally, many small banks are local. For this reason,
in order to isolate the eect of online presence we adapt the concept of Multimarket Contact used
5Call Reports also track the presence of an internet website since 1999.
4in papers such as Evans and Kessides (1994) for the airline industry. The idea of this index is to
weigh the characteristics of each competitor according to how close a substitute their product is.
In the case of the banking industry, two banks can be considered closer substitutes if, among other
things, their network of branches overlaps more often. In the sample and period we analyze, a
large majority of the banks that have not adopted Internet banking are small and operate in local
markets for which competition is still geographically localized and whose clientele is for the most
part formed by retail depositors and small business borrowers.
Our index of Multimarket Contact is constructed as a weighted sum of indicator functions for
a bank's competitors at the local-market level. The indicator is 1 if the competitor has adopted
online-banking and its weight corresponds to the share of the deposits that the competitor holds
in this market. The Multimarket Contact index averages the values for the dierent markets
according to the share of the total deposits of the bank that each market represents. Obviously,
this index is bank specic and it varies over time.
In this paper we use the Multimarket Contact index (MMC) to address dierent issues from
the ones studied in the literature. While papers such as Evans and Kessides (1994) and Waldfogel
and Wulf (2006) relate the extent of multimarket contact with the probability that rms tacitly
collude, in this paper we take this index as a proxy of the strategic motivation for banks to adopt
online operations as a competitive response to the rivals' actions.
The denition of the relevant market is a controversial issue both in the literature and as part
of the decisions of regulators and antitrust authorities over proposed mergers. Kwast et al. (1997)
estimated that, in 1992, more than 75% of households and small businesses did their banking
business within 15 miles of their house/work and oces, respectively. In recent years, for some
products bank competition is becoming global. Petersen and Rajan (2002) show, for example, that
the increase in hard information on the credit activity of small rms has reduced the advantage of
the local presence of banks in lending activity. For some other products, however, competition is
still geographically localized. Heiteld and Prager (2004) shows that this is the case for checking
accounts and to a lower extent for saving accounts and money market deposit accounts.
The market denitions we use in this study constitute another contribution of this paper. We
use market denitions from the recently available Cassidi
R  database, compiled by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. These market denitions by the twelve Federal Reserve districts have
arisen mostly in response to antitrust disputes resulting from mergers and acquisitions. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper to make use of the Cassidi
R  denitions.
In addition to the competitive environment, we also analyze which rm-specic factors con-
stitute the most important determinants in the decision to adopt online banking. We nd that
rm characteristics such as size or belonging to a holding company positively aect the decision
5to adopt. Indicators of a bank's nancial health and business strategy such as the loans to assets
ratio and the share of nonperforming loans are also found to be important factors in the adoption
decision. We also contribute to the debate over the substitutability or complementarity of online
banking and other channels of bank presence, as measured by branching intensity or the ratio of
the number of branches to assets. We nd evidence of substitutability, since banks with greater
branching intensity tend to delay adoption.
Controlling for these bank-specic characteristics, our results support the hypothesis that com-
petitive considerations play an important role in adoption decisions. We nd that controlling for
the concentration in deposits (as measured by the Herndahl index) facing banks in the various
markets in which they operate, the MMC index allows us to conclude that for similar levels of
concentration in the market, adoption of online banking occurs faster in markets where rivals have
already adopted.
Our results shed some light on which of the determinants described by Karshenas and Stone-
man (1993) underlie the adoption decisions of online banking. Rank (size) eects are the main
motivation. Although epidemic eects could have been important in the initial days of online
banking, we nd that after the technology has been established they have not had a signicant
impact, at least in the diusion among rms in the same holding group. The signicant coecient
for the MMC indicates that competition also plays an important role. In other words, a bank's
adoption is partially triggered by the competitors' adoption. Furthermore, the positive eect of
competition on the decision to adopt rules out predominant order (or preemption) eects, that
would be consistent with a negative sign of the MMC. Our results, therefore, are in line with a
positive impact of stock eects. Banks that are yet to adopt could be aected by a stigma vis-a-vis
its competitors.
Our estimations are robust to changes in the measures of the relevant market denition or the
variable used to denote the online presence. In particular, using alternative market denitions,
such as local markets at a zip code or county level, also yields a positive relationship between the
competitors' adoption (measured by the MMC index) and a bank's adoption decision.
We also address the possible simultaneity of our measure of multimarket contact in the sense
that it could be caused by market-specic characteristics that might at the same time be causing
the individual bank adoption. Accounting for this possibility with a two-stage logit procedure
yields no evidence of such an eect.
Finally, we study whether a bank's decision to adopt is taken individually or at the holding
company level. Our rst look at this issue shows that not all banks in a group adopt simultaneously.
This evidence suggests that although a bank's cost to adopt decreases when other banks in the
holding company have already adopted, overall, the online banking adoption decision is better
6explained as a bank-level choice.
Section 2 briey describes the sector and the evolution of online banking adoption in the United
States. Section 3 discusses the measures of competition used in the paper. Section 4 presents the
empirical strategy. Section 4 explains the construction of the database and section 5 discusses the
main specication. Section 6 performs some robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
2 The Pattern of Online-Banking Adoption
Customers interact with their banks in several ways. Although most of the transactions tradition-
ally occurred at the branch counter, new technologies have reduced the costs that customers had
to bear. For example, ATMs became widespread by the mid-eighties, making some transactions
easier. Telephone banking, initially human operated and later voice automated, reduced the need
to visit a bank's physical branch. In recent years, particularly since 1995, the internet has made
banking easier and allowed institutions to oer newer services to their customers, further reducing
the need to stop by a branch oce.
The cost of setting up a transactional website has decreased substantially in recent years, mak-
ing the signicant cost savings it entails very protable. Good estimates of the cost of setting up
a transactional website are dicult to come by. Celent, a nancial consulting company, estimated
that in 2000 the cost of building an in-house online banking system exceeded $500;000, although
the costs of outsourcing it were substantially smaller.6 This last option should be more attractive
for smaller banks like the ones present in our sample. Our econometric specication will capture
the cost of online banking as part of the time trend. Regarding marginal costs, the cost of an
online transaction is estimated to be as low as $0:01 as opposed to the cost of a transaction at
a branch of $1.7 These cost savings together with the widespread use of the internet has enticed
smaller banks to adopt this technology. According to DeYoung (2001) around 1,100 banks and
thrifts operated a transactional website in 1999. This number increased to around 4,000 banks at
the beginning of 2003. Since then, banks have adopted at a rate of about 5% per quarter. By the
end of 2006 around 6,600 banks (80% of the total) provided online banking to their customers.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of adoption in recent years.
For the purpose of this paper, it is important to emphasize that internet-only banks (those that
operate without any branch) have remained an oddity in the United States. In 2000 they accounted
for less than 1% of the deposits and constituted less than 5% of all transactional websites. In 2004,
6 See http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/04DAD6EC-0908-11D5-AB75-00508B95258D/12952/Is_Internet_
Banking_Profitable999998.pdf.
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Figure 1: Proportion of banks that have adopted online-banking in the period 2003-2006.
there were less than 30 internet-only banks.8 In fact, entry through the creation of bank branches
has remained important, and over 40% of the entrants during our sample period did not initially
provide a transactional website.
Table 7 in the appendix shows the stark dierences between those banks that adopted prior to
the beginning of 2003 and those that were yet to adopt. Non-adopters were in general smaller in
terms of deposits (and total assets) and had on average 80% fewer branches. They also operated
in fewer markets and devoted a bigger proportion of their activities to non-urban markets.
The larger size of earlier adopters, consistent with the rank eects previously mentioned, is
natural for several reasons. The main one, as mentioned above, is that the setup cost of online
services is not likely to be sensitive to the size of the bank. Beyond that, smaller banks face
additional challenges. For example, Nathan (1999) emphasizes that community banks (usually
dened as banks with total assets of $1 billion or less) rely more for customer screening on closer
and more personalized contact. For them, the access to a wider market, and more dicult to
monitor, might be less protable.
8See DeYoung (2001) and Wang (2006). The last author argues that their little success is due to the com-
plementarity between brick-and-mortar and online channels: While standardized products are easily distributed
through the online channel, specialized products require a branch presence. As a result, internet-only banks are
found to have on average a lower return on assets. Delgado et al. (2004) nds similar evidence for European banks
attributed, however, to the lack of economies of scale derived from their smaller size.
83 Measures of Competition
3.1 The Index of Multimarket Contact
This paper originates from the idea that the decision to adopt online banking depends on the
behavior of competitors over and above the level of market concentration previously considered
in the literature. In the banking industry, expanding the number of branches and choosing their
location has traditionally constituted one of the main channels of competition. Online banking
provides an alternative strategy to the creation of new bank branches, while at the same time it
reduces customer transaction costs.
At least in the short run, the provision of online banking services is likely to steal customers
from competitors that operate in similar geographic areas, where overlapping of their branch
network is important. The Multimarket Contact Index (MMC) accounts for this factor by giving
dierent weights to banks that coincide in dierent areas and have a dierent volume of deposits.
In particular, if bank i has branches in the set Mi of markets and we denote as Bs the set of banks















where Djs denotes the sum of deposits of bank j in market s and Ij is an indicator function that
takes the value 1 if bank j has adopted online banking in a previous period and 0 otherwise.9
Notice that the index excludes the bank for which it is computed. This exclusion avoids some
spurious correlation in our estimations originating from the period in which the bank decides to
adopt and the corresponding change in multimarket contact.
This index can also be interpreted as the share of deposits controlled by the competitors of
bank i that have already adopted in the markets where this bank operates. The weights assigned
to each competitor are increasing in its market share in that particular market. These weights are
also increasing in the share that this market represents in the total volume of deposits of bank i.
Figure 2 shows the MMC index for banks that had not adopted by the rst quarter of 2003.
In most of the markets where these banks operate a vast majority of competitors have already
adopted. As a result, we could expect banks in our sample to be factoring in their adoption decision
a response to the rivals' adoption.
During the sample period under study, 59% of the banks that had not adopted by the rst
quarter of 2003 had adopted by the fourth quarter of 2006. The pattern of adoption, however, was
9This index is bank- and period-specic. However, in order to simplify the exposition we have excluded the time
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Figure 2: The MMC index for the rst quarter of 2003 among all banks that had not adopted.
MMC < 0:2 MMC > 0:8
Adoption (I=1) 43(44%) 1475(62%)
No Adoption (I=0) 55(56%) 914(38%)
Table 1: Adoption in the period 2003-2006 for dierent values of the initial 2003 MMC.
dierent for those banks that operated in markets where competitors have already adopted and
those that were yet to adopt. As Table 1 shows, adoption in markets where the MMC was close to
1 in 2003 was, on average, almost fty percent more likely than in those markets where the MMC
was close to 0.
3.2 The Herndahl-Hirschman Index
The adoption decision by competitors is not necessarily the only strategic consideration in a bank's
decision to adopt online banking. The literature discussed in the introduction has already provided
substantial evidence showing that adoption depends on the characteristics of the markets in which
each bank operates. Besides demand-side considerations that are likely to inuence the protability
of online banking (consumer internet access, education attainment, level of income, etc), this
protability is likely to depend also on the level of competition in each market. Some standard
theories, for example, suggest that competition spurs innovation as a way to achieve cost reductions
or to achieve dierentiated products.
In this paper, we measure competition using the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). As op-
10posed to the usual analysis of competition among rms that operate in the same market, dierent
banks have activities in dierent geographical areas. As a result, the measures of competition
will be also bank-specic, reecting the average conditions among all the markets in which each
bank operates. For this reason we compute the HHI for bank i as the weighted average of all the
HHIs in the local markets where this bank operates. Similarly to the MMC computed earlier, the
weights correspond to the share of total deposits of bank i in each of the markets. In particular,
















An important concern, however, is that online banking changes the nature of bank competi-
tion, making geographical location of bank branches irrelevant. This change should have a limited
impact on our results. First, banks of similar size are likely to be exposed to similar increases in
competition due to the adoption of other institutions, adding to the constant term of our regres-
sions. Second, as mentioned before, customers of small banks (like the ones in our sample) typically
place an important value to the personalized service, which emphasizes the local component.
4 The Empirical Model
In the empirical model we estimate the determinants of the timing of adoption. This decision is
intrinsically dynamic in nature. When a bank decides whether to adopt in a particular moment in
time or not, it compares the cost to be incurred and the increase in present value of prots with
what could be attained in the best alternative time of future adoption. This decision is in essence
an optimal stopping-time rule.
We denote the present value of prots of rm i (net of the cost of adoption) when it adopts in
period t as V A
it . Similarly, we denote the present value of prots of not adopting in t, and instead
waiting until the best future period, as V NA
it . We posit a reduced-form model for the dierence in
prots between these two options as a latent variable y
it which depends on a vector of exogenous
variables aecting the adoption decision as follows
y

it =  + xit + wit + zit + "it:
The vector of variables xit corresponds to bank-specic characteristics, wit are market character-
istics, zit are measures of competition, and "it is an error term.10 Notice that in our specication
10These regressors can be interpreted as the relevant state variables in the dynamic problem.
11both market characteristics and measures of competition are bank-specic, since they are weighted
according to the deposits of each bank across all the geographical markets where it operates.
We do not observe the latent variable y
it and instead we observe the outcome of the adoption
decision, yit. We dene this variable to be equal to 1 if the rm i oers online-banking services
and 0 if it has not adopted them yet. We assume that a bank adopts in period t if and only if its
present value of prots of adopting is higher than the present value of prots of waiting. That is,
yit = 1 if and only if y
it = V A
it   V NA
it  0. Furthermore, we assume that the adoption decision is
irreversible. Thus, banks do not provide (to the econometrician) any additional information after
they have adopted.
We estimate a discrete hazard model of duration until the adoption decision. Let Ti be the
random-variable representing the period of adoption for each bank i. The hazard rate of adopting
in period t, the probability of adoption in period t conditional on not having adopted before, is
dened as
hit  Pr(Ti = tjTi  t;xit;wit;zit):
Thus, the unconditional probability of adoption in period t corresponds to










and the unconditional probability that the rm adopts at a future date is




Building on Allison (1982), papers such as Jenkins (1995) show that this model can be easily






[yit loghit + (1   yit)log(1   hit)];
where Si is the actual number of periods bank i is present in the sample. This is the likelihood
function of a static discrete-choice model for yit that can be estimated using standard econo-
metric packages. However, it is particular in the way in which observations are organized. The
model stacks all the observations for a particular bank for all the periods before it adopts, and it
drops observations of that bank in all periods after adoption since they do not provide additional
12information regarding this decision.11
For the purpose of this paper we use a logit specication for this discrete-choice model, which
in this case implies that
hit =
exp( + xit + wit + zit)
1 + exp( + xit + wit + zit)
:
5 Data
Our dataset consists of quarterly information for all commercial banks in the U.S. during the
period 2002:1-2006:4. These data were obtained from the Call Reports made available by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Since the second quarter of 1999, the Call Reports provide the address of a bank's website
if it exists. Most important for this analysis, starting in the rst quarter of 2003, they also
report whether the bank's website oers transactional capabilities, such as downloading statements,
transferring money between accounts, or paying bills. We use this variable as the indicator for
the adoption of online-banking. This variable is also used in the construction of the multimarket
contact index.
From the Call Reports data we obtain bank-specic variables used in the vector xit. These
variables include: (log) total assets to measure bank size, the number of branches, and the (log)
age of the bank. The Call Reports also allow us to construct standard measures of protability
and bank nancial health, such as the return on assets, the share of non-performing loans, the
loans to assets ratio, and the equity to assets ratio. Following other papers in the literature, we
have constructed the variable for branching intensity as a ratio of number of branches over total
assets. We have lagged this variable one period in order to avoid endogeneity issues.
We have also gathered annual branch-level data for each bank in the sample using the Summary
of Deposits from the FDIC. This dataset includes for each bank the deposits per branch as of June
of each year. This dataset provides information about the geographical location of each branch,
including the postal address, and whether the branch is located in a metropolitan area or not.
The Summary of Deposits also reports information on whether the bank belongs to a multi-
bank holding company, a one-bank holding company or it is an independent bank. We include
these variables as additional bank characteristics in the vector xit. We take the indicator for an
independent bank as the reference category and we include the other two as dummy variables.
11For that same reason we cannot obtain additional information from the rms that adopted before the rst
period in our sample without very strong assumptions. The reason is that adoption means that the present value
of prots was positive at the moment of adoption but it does not imply that they were also positive in the initial
period of the sample.
13We match the deposits data from the Summary of Deposits with the bank level information
from the Call Reports and we use them to construct the measures of competition in the vector zit,
i.e., the HHI and MMC indexes discussed earlier in the paper.
Finally, we also control for several market characteristics in the vector wit. First, we account
for whether the bank operates in metropolitan or rural areas averaging the share of deposits that
corresponds to branches located in metropolitan areas over all of the bank's branches. Second, we
obtain demographic information at the county level from the 2000 U.S. Census. These variables
include median household income, and the percent of people aged 18 to 64 who have completed a
bachelor's degree or higher. We add to this information the percent of households with internet
access from the 2003 Internet Usage Supplement of the Current Population Survey.12 For banks
that operate in more than one state, all the demographic variables are averaged across markets
using as weights the share of the deposits that each market represents for the bank. Therefore,
although the demographic variables are time-invariant, the bank-specic averages do vary over
time (on an annual basis) because the deposit information is observed once every year.
Summary statistics of the above variables are presented in Table 7 in the appendix. Table 8
reports the correlation among the variables.
5.1 The Cassidi Markets
The 12 Federal Reserve Banks dene local banking markets within their districts. Banking reg-
ulators use these denitions, for example, when analyzing mergers or acquisitions. According to
the 2006 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
\A local banking market is an economically integrated area that includes and sur-
rounds a central city or large town. Often banking markets are based on metropolitan
or similar areas in urban regions, and on counties in rural regions. Local economic
and demographic data { such as commuting patterns, locations of large employers and
retailers, an other information that could demonstrate an economic tie or separation
between two areas { are used to enlarge or shrink the size of the market from the base."
So far around 1,500 markets have been dened according to these criteria, encompassing most
of the country. Many of these markets straddle two or more states. The Federal Reserve of
12The 2003 Internet Usage Supplement provides, for each state, an estimate of the share of households with
internet access at the state level and an estimate of the share of households with internet access for households
residing in metropolitan areas. We assigned the metro estimate to all metropolitan counties in the state and we
assigned the state estimate to all nonmetropolitan counties in the state.
14St. Louis has homogenized this information and made it available at their Cassidi
R  website.13 The
application created in this website includes all currently dened markets and interactive maps for
many of them.
Our initial database consists of observations for 7,788 banks present in the rst quarter of 2003.
We eliminate 3,683 banks that have already adopted (they already have a transactional website)
in the rst period of the sample. We also eliminate 2 banks with coding errors in the indicator
for online-banking adoption in the rst period. The resulting bank panel has 4,103 banks that
have not adopted by the rst quarter of 2003. Of these banks, 445 do not appear in all periods of
the sample, probably as a result of bank failures or acquisitions.14 For each bank we observe at
most 15 quarters until the adoption decision is made, since by construction we do not observe any
adoption in the rst period. Of these banks, 4,048 were community banks, with assets of strictly
less than 1 billion dollars. By the end of the sample there were still 1,599 banks yet to adopt.
We have matched the address of each bank branch with the Cassidi bank market denitions.
There is a small fraction of bank branches in cities or towns for which a Cassidi market has not
been dened. For these cases, in our benchmark model we substitute the corresponding county or
metropolitan area as the market of reference. The benchmark results do not change substantially
if we dropped those observations instead.
In the logit regressions, future observations of banks are eliminated from the sample after they
decide to adopt. In total, the resulting unbalanced panel has about 42,000 observations. Some
additional observations are lost when we construct the instruments we use in the two-stage logit
we discuss later in the paper.
6 Results
The results of the baseline estimation are reported in Table 2 for four dierent specications. In
model (1) we include only bank-specic variables in addition to the multimarket contact index. In
model (2) we also include the Herndahl index to control for market concentration, and in model
(5) we control also for demographic variables. Whereas models (1) to (3) include a second-order
polynomial for a time trend, model (4) introduces time xed eects. In what follows, we discuss the
average marginal eects presented in the accompanying columns, but qualitatively there are little
dierences between the 4 models presented. All nancial ratios, as well as the MMC index, are
measured in decimal points (0.01 is equivalent to 1 percentage point). The HHI is normalized to be
13See http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org. We specially thank Adam Zaretsky and Neil Wiggins for providing us
with the data and helping us understand some of its peculiarities.
14Our estimation results do not dier signicantly if those banks are excluded from the sample.
15between 0 and 1. The demand variables (education, internet access) are measured as percentages.
Median household income is measured in thousands of dollars.
The eects of the bank-specic variables are similar across model specications. The size of
the bank in terms of (log) assets has the expected positive eect on the decision to adopt. To
the extent that the cost of adoption is quite invariant with the size of the bank, larger banks are
likely to adopt earlier.15 Because assets are measured in logs, the interpretation of the coecient
of 0.01250 (in column 5 of table 2) is that, on average (across all observations) an increase of 5% in
assets increases the probability of adoption by approximately 6 basis points per quarter (0.01250
 0.05 = 0.000625 or 6.25 bp) and the eect is statistically signicant. Membership to either a
one-bank or a multi-bank holding company is also positive and statistically signicant. Banks in
a one-bank holding company are about 2 percentage points more likely to adopt than stand-alone
banks, whereas banks in a multi-bank holding company are about 3 percentage points more likely
to adopt than stand-alone banks.
A standard measure of banks' overall health, the share of non-performing loans, has a strongly
negative and statistically signicant eect on the decision to adopt. On average, an increase of
1 percentage points in the share of non-performing loans reduces the probability of adoption by
about 50 basis points per quarter. In other words, banks with a worse loan portfolio would tend to
delay adoption. This result might be due to short-run considerations derived from concerns related
to the survival of the bank as opposed to the long-run investment that online banking represents.16
A common measure of protability is the return on assets. Our results indicate that this
variable has a negative and statistically signicant eect on the adoption decision. An increase
of 1 percentage points in the return on assets decreases the probability of adoption by about 28
basis points per quarter. This result suggests that less protable banks are hard pressed to adopt
online banking sooner, perhaps as a way of exploring new business opportunities in an attempt to
improve protability. Nevertheless, because most of the banks in our sample are small, the usage
of return on assets as a measure of protability in this case is subject to important caveats as
exposed in Gilbert and Wheelock (2007). Hence, the interpretation of this measure must be taken
with caution.
The probability of adoption is also positively related to the ratio of loans to assets. A 1
percentage point increase in this ratio increases the probability of adoption by about 6 basis
points per quarter. One possible interpretation of this result is that more aggressive banks hold a
15The time trend in the specications would then capture, among other things, the common component in the
technological progress that drives down the cost of adoption.
16Alternatively, it could be argued that to the extent that online banking can be used as a way to capture new
customers, banks that are better at screening projects (and have a lower non-performing loans ratio) obtain a higher























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17bigger loan portfolio and, in their strategy, online banking is a channel to attract more resources.
Similarly, the ratio of equity to assets (a measure of leverage or capitalization) might be a proxy for
conservative banking. Under this interpretation, our results would suggest that more conservative
banks tend to be more reluctant to adopt online operations. An increase of 1 percentage points in
the equity to assets ratio reduces the probability of adoption by about 22 basis points per quarter.
The variable that measures branching intensity (branches to assets ratio) allows us to determine
whether online banking is regarded as a substitute or a complement to the physical presence. The
negative and signicant coecient illustrated in table 2 suggests that physical branches and online
banking are substitute strategies, as the probability of adoption declines with branching intensity.
The age of a bank is measured in log years to account for the skewness in the age distribution.
This variable has a negative sign as in Sullivan and Wang (2005) although it is only marginally
signicant.
Regarding the strategic motivations of the adoption decision, in all the models the eect of
the MMC index is positive and highly signicant. That is, the adoption by more competitors in
the relevant markets makes a bank more likely to adopt. This eect persists in all specications
in spite of the introduction of the Herndahl index in models (2) to (4). The eect of the MMC
index on adoption can be interpreted as follows: on average, an increase of 10 percentage points in
the share of deposits controlled by a bank's competitors which have already adopted increases the
probability of adoption between 34-40 basis points per quarter. To put this eect in perspective, it
is important to remember that the observed probability of adoption is about 5% per quarter. The
Herndahl index, however, is not signicant in any of the specications and the sign is ambiguous.
Although variables are measured in dierent units, it seems that bank specic characteristics,
such as the ratio of nonperforming loans, the equity to assets ratio, or the return on assets have
a substantially larger economic eect on adoption than the competitive motivations measured by
the MMC. Still, our results show that strategic considerations in geographically localized markets
do play a signicant role in the decision.
Finally, we have included demographic variables in specications (3) and (4) to account for
demand factors. Median household income, the percent of households with internet access, and
the percent of population with a college degree all have the expected positive eect on adoption.
The term that interacts education and internet access has a negative sign, indicating that education
becomes less important for banks that operate in markets where internet is more widespread.
One possible caveat of our analysis is the existence of omitted variables correlated with the
decision to adopt and with the MMC index that could bias our results. These variables could
include structural characteristics of the markets where these banks operate (for example, rural
versus urban areas). As a rst take on this issue, we include in models (3) and (4), the proportion
18of bank business (in terms of deposits) conducted in metropolitan areas. This variable is not
statistically signicant, and its introduction does not aect the coecient of the MMC. In the next
sections we explicitly address the possible simultaneity of the MMC, and show that accounting for
this fact does not change the results signicantly.
Finally, an important concern is whether the results are driven by a small number of banks
and, specially, banks that have been in the market for only a few years and for which nancial
ratios do not reect the banks' long-run nancial standing. Similar concerns might arise for large
banks, that operate at a national scale, and in markets with a dierent competitive structure
than, smaller, community banks. In order to address this issue we have also restricted the sample
eliminating de-novo banks (5 years or younger) and those with assets in excess of 1 billion dollars.
The sample is reduced by about two thousand observations, but the (unreported) results do not
display noticeable dierences with the tables presented here.
7 Adoption in Bank Groups
The results from section 6 indicate that a bank's membership to either a one-bank or a multi-bank
holding company is an important determinant of the adoption decision. In this section we explore
this issue further and characterize some of the dierences between independent banks and those
that are members of a holding company.
An initial question in this case is whether the internet-banking adoption decision is taken at
the bank level (as we have assumed so far) or instead it is a holding company decision. The second
case would be consistent with all banks in the holding company clustering their adoption around
the same time period. In our data, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, in any period a large
proportion of banks belonging to holding companies in which other member banks have previously
adopted have yet to adopt.
Moreover, our data contains 121 bank holding companies in which no bank had adopted in
the rst period. Most of these holding companies typically include two or three banks, and their
adoption is often progressive. For example, by the second period of the data, among bank holding
companies in which there is adoption, in only 40% all member banks adopt simultaneously. This
evidence seems to indicate that adoption is mainly an individual bank decision.
In order to examine whether the dierent behavior of banks that belong to holding companies
is due mainly to technological reasons, we study them separately from the rest of the banks. Table
3 examines these dierences. Column (1) in this table reports the logit coecients of a model
similar to model (4) in table 2, where only the dummy for the variable `Multigroup' has been
included. Columns (2) and (3) in table 3 present the logit coecients for the samples of one-
19bank holding companies and independent banks vis-a-vis banks belonging to multibank holding
companies. Columns (5) to (7) report the average marginal eects of these three regressions.
Our results, according to column (5) in table 3, indicate that membership in a multibank
holding company increases the incentives to adopt online banking by about 1 percentage point.
When we separate banks belonging to multibank holding companies from the rest, we see that
most variables aect both kinds of banks in the same direction. The comparison of columns (6)
and (7), however, shows that the magnitude of these eects varies depending on the kind of bank.
For example, measures of protability are more important for banks that belong to a multibank
holding. The substitution between bank branches and internet banking adoption seems to be more
important also for banks in multibank holding companies. In fact, except for the eects of the loans
to assets ratio and the bank's size which are larger for independent banks or banks in one-bank
holding companies, the marginal eects of most bank-specic measures are larger in magnitude
for banks that belong to a multibank holding company.
Banks in multibank holding companies also seem to respond more to strategic considerations
in their adoption decisions. The eect of the adoption of competitors, the MMC index, is about
twice as large as for independent banks or one-bank holding company banks. Interestingly, banks
in multibank holding companies tend to adopt earlier in more concentrated markets. That is, the
Herndahl index has a positive and statistically signicant eect.
In an omitted regression that includes the interactions of the holding company dummy with
the signicant regressors in column (1), a log-likelihood ratio test of the joint signicance of the
holding company dummy and the interactions also rejects the null hypothesis of no eects of
holding company membership.
Table 3 also includes an additional specication in column (4) and its corresponding marginal
eects in column (8), for the sample of banks that belong to a multibank holding company. In
this model a variable measuring the number of rms in the same holding that have adopted online
banking has been added. This variable can be understood as a proxy for epidemic eects at the
holding company level. It has a positive but not signicant eect on the probability of adoption
which indicates that the diusion of this innovation is at this stage a marginal determinant of the
decision to adopt.
An interpretation of these results is that banks belonging to a multibank holding company
may face some advantages in the adoption of the technology. These advantages, however, are






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section we perform several sensitivity checks to study the robustness of the results to
changes in the geographic denitions used for our measure of multimarket contact. We also study
the potential existence of omitted variables in our benchmark specication. In an earlier working
paper version we show that the results are preserved if we alternatively use the mere existence of
a corporate website as a measure of internet presence, regardless of whether this website allows
customers to perform transactions online.
8.1 Changes in the Geographical Denition
In this section we consider a denition of bank markets that is more familiar in the literature. In
particular, we distinguish between urban and rural areas. For urban areas we use the so-called
Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA). For rural areas we assign the county as the market. CBSAs
are used by the U.S. Census Bureau to replace the denitions of metropolitan areas dened in 1990
and they are organized around urban centers of at least 10,000 people. With this new denition
we recompute the Multimarket contact index and the Herndahl-Hirschman index. We report the
results in tables 4.
Our results are in line with those of the previous sections. The eects of the dierent control
variables maintain the same sign and comparable magnitudes. Some variables lose statistical
signicance, while others that were not statistically signicant become so with the inclusion of these
additional cities. It is interesting to notice that the MMC index remains statistically signicant in
all specications and its average marginal eect is very similar to the one obtained in the baseline
case.
Finally, previous versions of the paper considered alternative denitions of geographical mar-
kets. We entertained two possibilities; the usage of the zip code or the county as a relevant market.
The results were qualitatively unchanged and for brevity they have been omitted in this version
of the paper.
8.2 Omitted Variables
Our results relating competition to the adoption of a transactional website hinge on the idea that
no relevant variables for the adoption decision (and correlated to the MMC) have been omitted in
the regression. If such variables exist our results are likely to be biased.
Our benchmark model tries to control for the most obvious candidate for these omitted vari-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23bank's own adoption. The fact that variables such as the share of deposits that correspond to
branches in metropolitan areas (as a measure of clientele in rural areas) do not aect substantially
the results in table 2 suggests that this might not be an important problem.
In this subsection we take a dierent approach. One of the usual remedies to control for the
existence of omitted variables is to instrument the MMC index with a variable that although
correlated with the adoption of competitors it does not directly aect the bank's adoption in any
other way. In particular, we consider as an instrument the percentage of competitor banks that
belong to a holding. As we have earlier shown, membership in a holding company is positively
correlated with the bank's own adoption, and hence this variable should be positively correlated
with the MMC index. However, there is no reason to expect that this variable aects the adoption
decision beyond the channel considered. Our instrument has a correlation of about 30% with the
MMC.
We estimate this model using a two-stage logit, modifying the probit procedure outlined in
Wooldridge (2001) (pg. 472), which in our case yields consistent estimators albeit under stronger
distributional assumptions. In particular, in the rst stage we compute the residuals from regress-
ing the MMC on the exogenous variables of our model together with the instrument described
earlier. The standardized residuals of this rst stage are introduced in the logit estimation as
an additional regressor. Table 9 in the appendix and table 5 report the rst and second stage
respectively.17
The results in these tables do not present signicant changes with respect to our benchmark
specication. The magnitude of the MMCs eect is similar and statistically signicant. It is also
important to notice that the residual from the rst stage is not signicant in the logit specication,
reinforcing the idea that omitted variables should not be biasing the results.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the determinants of the adoption of online banking operations
among U.S. banks. In contrast with the existing literature, we regard the adoption decision as a
strategic dynamic choice. For this reason we use a recently available panel dataset that allows us
to track adoption decisions over time that we estimate using a discrete hazard model.
One of the contributions of this paper has been to study the eects of competition in a con-
text where rms interact in a geographical environment. The adoption of online banking occurs
17The t-statistics reported for the second stage are obtained using a bootstrap procedure. For the estimation of
the average marginal eects we follow Wooldridge (2001) (pg. 475) and for the calculation of the standard errors we
rely on the delta method using numerical derivatives. The signicance is reported using the theoretical distribution,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25simultaneously across all markets where the bank operates. By controlling for the level of concen-
tration in each market we isolate the strategic component of the adoption decision and nd it to
be signicant in a variety of specications.
We also nd that bank-specic characteristics, such standard measures of nancial health and
bank size, are the main determinants in the adoption decision. Our results also indicate that bank
membership to a holding company is an important factor in the speed of adoption. However, the
fact that banks in most holding companies do not adopt simultaneously indicates that the adoption
decision is taken at the bank level.
The paper also sheds some light on the role of online banking as a part of a bank's strategy.
We show that these institutions regard it as an alternative to opening new branches.
In terms of the competitive eects that condition the adoption decision described by Karshenas
and Stoneman (1993), we nd that stock eects are a sensible explanation for our results. The
positive eect of the competitor's adoption in the adoption decision indicates that these decisions
are strategic complements. This positive eect also suggests that order eects are unlikely, because
the preemptive adoption of competitors would entail a negative eect on a bank's decision. Inas-
much as adoption is unrelated to the adoption of other banks in the same group, we nd evidence
against epidemic eect.
This paper is a rst approach to the study of these strategic considerations. Further research
in this area might pursue the specication of a structural dynamic model of adoption. Although
at a cost of higher technical complexity, structural estimation could help quantifying the eect of
each motivation.
Finally, the setup in this paper can be applied to other contexts. Many adoption decisions
are irreversible and implemented in several markets at the same time. An example could be the
adoption of new inventory systems for retailers that operate in several markets, to the extent that
competitors partially overlap across dierent markets.
26References
Akhavein, Jalal, W. Scott Frame and Lawrence J. White, \The Diusion of Financial
Innovations: An Examination of the Adoption of Small Business Credit Scoring bny Large
Banking Organizations," Journal of Business, 2005, 78(2), pp. 577{596.
Allison, Paul D., \Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories," in S. Leinhardt,
ed., Sociological Methodology, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1982 pp. 61{97.
Chang, Yoonhee Tina, \Dynamics of Banking Technology Adoption: An Application to Internet
Banking," 2004, unpublished Manuscript.
Corrocher, Nicoletta, \Internet adoption in Italian banks: An empirical investigacion," Research
Policy, 2006, 35, pp. 533{544.
Delgado, Javier, Ignacio Hernando and Mar a Jes us Nieto, \Perspectivas de rentabilidad
de la banca por Internet en Europa," Estabilidad Financiera, May 2004, 6, pp. 173{188.
DeYoung, Robert, \The Financial Performance of Pure Play Internet Banks," Economic Per-
spectives, 2001, 25, pp. 60{75.
DeYoung, Robert, William W. Lang and Daniel L. Nolle, \How the Internet aects output
and performance at community banks," Journal of Banking and Finance, 2007, 31, pp. 1033{
1060.
Evans, William N. and Ioannis N. Kessides, \Living by the Golden Rule: Multimarket
Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109, pp. 341{
366.
Furst, Karen, William W. Lang and Daniel E. Nolle, \Internet Banking in the U.S.:
Landscape Prospects and Industry Implications," Journal of Financial Transformation, 2001,
2, pp. 93{113.
Geroski, Paul A., \Models of technology diusion," Research Policy, 2000, 29, pp. 603{625.
Gilbert, R. Alton and David C. Wheelock, \Measuring Commercial Bank Protability:
Proceed with Caution," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 2007, forthcoming.
Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Joanna Stavins, \Network Externalities and Technology Adop-
tion: Lessons from Electronic Payments," RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2004, 35(2),
pp. 260{276.
27Hannan, Timothy H. and John M. McDowell, \The Determinants of Technology Adoption:
The Case of the Banking Firm," The Rand Journal of Economics, 1984, 15, pp. 328{335.
|, \Rival Precedence and Dynamics of Technology Adoption: an Empirical Analysis," Economica,
1987, 54, pp. 155{171.
Heiteld, Erik and Robin A. Prager, \The geographic scope of retail deposit markets,"
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2004, 25(1), pp. 37{55.
Hoppe, Heidrun C., \The Timing of New Technology Adoption: Theoretical Models and Em-
pirical Evidence," The Manchester School, 2002, pp. 56{76.
Ingham, Hilary. and Steve Thompson, \The adoption of new technology in nancial services:
the case of building societies," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1993, 2.
Jenkins, Stephen P., \Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics of Statistics, 1995, 57, pp. 129{139.
Karshenas, Massoud and Paul L. Stoneman, \Rank, Stock, Order and Epidemic Eects
in the Diusion of New Pprocess Technologies: an Empirical Model," The Rand Journal of
Economics, 1993, 24(4), pp. 503{528.
Kwast, Myron L., Martha Starr-McCluer and John D. Wolken, \Market denition and
the analysis of antitrust in banking," Antitrust Bulletin, Winter 1997, 42(4), pp. 973{996.
Nathan, Luxman, \www.your-community-bank.com: Community Banks Are Going Online,"
Communities and Banking, 1999, 27, pp. 2{8.
Nickerson, David and Richard J. Sullivan, \Financial Innovation, Strategic Real Options and
Endogenous Competition: Theory and an Application to Internet Banking," Payments System
Research Working Paper PSR WP 03-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2003.
Oster, Sharon, \The Diusion of Innovation Among Steel Firms: The Basic Oxygen Furnace,"
The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13, pp. 45{56.
Pennings, Johannes M. and Farid Harianto, \The Diusion of Technological Innovation in
the Commercial Banking Industry," Strategic Management Journal, 1992, 13, pp. 29{46.
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan, \Does Distance Still Matter? The In-
formation Revolution in Small Business Lending," Journal of Finance, December 2002, 57(6),
pp. 2533{2570.
28Rose, Nancy L. and Paul L. Joskow, \The Diusion of New Technologies: Evidence from the
Electric Utility Industry," The Rand Journal of Economics, 1990, 21(3), pp. 354{373.
Saloner, Garth and Andrea Shepard, \Adoption of Technologies with Network Eects: An
Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Teller Machines," RAND Journal of Economics,
Autumn 1995, 26(3), pp. 479{501.
Sullivan, Richard J. and Zhu Wang, \Internet banking: an exploration in technology diusion
and impact," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City, 2005.
The Economist, \Branching Out," The Economist: A Survey of Online Finance, May 20 2000,
pp. 19{23.
Waldfogel, Joel and Julie Wulf, \Measuring the Eect of Multimarket Contact on Competition:
Evidence from Mergers Following Radio Broadcast Ownership Deregulation," Contributions to
Economic Analysis & Policy, 2006, 5(1), pp. 1420{1420.
Wang, Zhu, \Online banking comes of age," TEN, 2006, (Win), pp. 22{25.
Wooldridge, Jerey M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press,
2001.
29A Data Appendix
Table 6: Variable Denitions and Sources
Variable Variable Code
Summary of Deposits
Branch Count Authors' calculations
Branch Deposits DEPSUMBR
Metropolitan Branch Flag CBSA METROB
Zip Code Branch ZIPBR
State Code Branch STNUMBR
Multi-Bank Holding Company Flag HCTMULT
One Bank Holding Company Flag HCTONE




Non-accrual or 90 days Past-due Loans rcfd1403 + rcfd1407
Total Loans and Leases rcfd2122
Total Assets rcfd2170
Net Income (numerator of ROA) riad4340





Population 2000 Census SF3 Long Form
Median Household Income 2000 Census SF3 Long Form
People aged 18 to 64 Years Who Have
Completed a Bachelor's Degree or Higher 2000 Census SF3 Long Form
Current Population Survey
Percent of Households with Internet Access 2003 Internet Usage Supplement
30Table 7: Summary Statistics as of March 2003
Variable stat. Adoption = 0 Adoption = 1 Total
Number of banks 4105 3683 7788
Age (years) Mean 67.2 62.0 64.7
Med. 79.2 69.2 73.2
MMC Index (Cassidi) Mean 0.7143 0.8177 0.7632
Med. 0.8026 0.8904 0.8608
Herndahl Index (Cassidi) Mean 0.2077 0.1913 0.2000
Med. 0.1701 0.1670 0.1684
Number of branches Mean 2.8 15.8 8.9
Med. 2.0 4.0 2.0
Branching Intensity Mean 0.0406 0.0263 0.0339
Med. 0.0330 0.0229 0.0272
Number of competitors Mean 27.1 35.2 31.0
Med. 12.0 17.4 14.0
Number of Cassidi markets codes Mean 1.4 3.2 2.3
Med. 1.0 1.0 1.0
Multi-bank holding Mean 0.2 0.3 0.2
Med. 0.0 0.0 0.0
One-bank holding Mean 0.6 0.6 0.6
Med. 1.0 1.0 1.0
Total Assets (mill.) Mean 188.7 1709.1 907.7
Med. 58.2 169.2 93.9
Equity to Asset Ratio Mean 0.1213 0.1015 0.1120
Med. 0.1028 0.0908 0.0962
Loan to Asset Ratio Mean 0.5809 0.6429 0.6102
Med. 0.5963 0.6652 0.6323
Non-Performing Loans Mean 0.0138 0.0099 0.0119
Med. 0.0074 0.0062 0.0067
Return on Assets Mean 0.0096 0.0111 0.0103
Med. 0.0107 0.0114 0.0110
Median Household Income (thous.) Mean 36.9 40.9 38.8
Med. 35.5 39.4 37.2
Metropolitan Share Mean 0.4266 0.6208 0.5184
Med. 0.0000 0.9750 0.6361
Education (college graduates) Mean 18.8 22.9 20.8
Med. 16.3 21.1 18.2
Internet use (%) Mean 58.0 60.5 59.2
Med. 58.3 60.8 59.5
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 9: First Stage Regression over MMC.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perc. of Competitors that belong to a holding 0.29371 0.27710 0.27381 0.27399
(49.711)*** (49.329)*** (49.318)*** (49.325)***
time 0.01023 0.01081 0.01117
(9.538)*** (10.607)*** (11.251)***
time2 0.00006 0.00003 0.00003
(0.814) (0.505) (0.445)
Branching Intensity 0.14141 0.14881 0.05183 0.05184
(3.193)*** (3.538)*** (1.261) (1.261)
Loans to Assets Ratio 0.02343 -0.01041 -0.02690 -0.02686
(3.333)*** (1.555) (4.066)*** (4.057)***
Return on Assets -0.49574 -0.43079 -0.26228 -0.26372
(7.060)*** (6.458)*** (4.028)*** (4.049)***
Nonperforming Loans Ratio -0.19699 -0.17311 -0.21150 -0.21228
(4.185)*** (3.872)*** (4.843)*** (4.860)***
(log) Total Assets 0.03484 0.03892 0.02370 0.02369
(24.789)*** (29.124)*** (17.423)*** (17.417)***
Equity to Assets Ratio -0.06866 -0.05045 -0.13088 -0.13096
(3.293)*** (2.547)** (6.717)*** (6.719)***
Multigroup -0.03542 -0.03441 -0.02160 -0.02159
(9.515)*** (9.730)*** (6.244)*** (6.242)***
Unigroup -0.02039 -0.02430 -0.01433 -0.01434
(7.537)*** (9.458)*** (5.692)*** (5.696)***
(log) Age -0.03365 -0.02889 -0.01476 -0.01475
(27.636)*** (24.935)*** (12.339)*** (12.329)***
Herndahl Index (Cassidi) -0.56843 -0.41006 -0.40991
(67.017)*** (45.511)*** (45.487)***
Metropolitan Share 0.07014 0.07016
(24.146)*** (24.151)***
Median Household Income 0.00165 0.00165
(8.545)*** (8.542)***
Education (college graduates) 0.01371 0.01372
(11.020)*** (11.025)***
Education x Internet -0.00020 -0.00020
(9.991)*** (9.994)***
Internet Use 0.00448 0.00449
(12.463)*** (12.464)***
Constant 0.37738 0.45338 0.16782 0.34364
(20.173)*** (25.465)*** (6.064)*** (12.302)***
Observations 41421 41421 41421 41421
R2 0.136 0.221 0.260 0.260
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
33